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Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 32, Box 1, Folder 1, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
The State of U.S.-China Relations: 
Time to Break the Stalemate 
Speech by 
Senator Mike Mansfield 
For more than half a century I have been an interested 
observer of China, beginning with my service there as a U.S. 
Marine in the early twenties. Recently I made my sixth trip 
to this ancient land. The China I remember from my visits in 
the twenties and the forties is vastly different from the China 
I saw in 1972, 1974 and again last Fall. It is difficult for 
one who has not witnessed the misery, sorrow, and degradation 
of life in old China to comprehend the significance of the 
changes that have taken place in the new China. 
The famines, rampant disease, and millions of homeless 
wanderers of the old China are gone. Although China is still 
a poor country by Western standards, it is rich in talented 
people, a strong culture, and abundant natural resources. For 
the first time in modern history, these have been meshed under 
a political system that is delivering the essentials of an 
adequate life to a quarter of mankind. The sleeping giant has 
awakened. China is on the move. 
There has always been much speculation in the outside world 
about political events in China. This period is no exception. 
But, it is highly unlikely that the composition of China's 
leadership will make any significant 
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difference in United States-China relations. Chairman Mao's 
legacy is large and no Chinese political figure will be able 
to stray far from the broad outlines of his policies, at home 
or abroad. What is important to the American people about 
China is not the makeup of its leadership or who is on the way 
up or down. The significance of China's political scene is 
that the system Chairman Mao created for China is working, 
bringing about rapid advances throughout the land. It has 
harnessed the talents of the Chinese people as never before in 
China's history to achieve common goals. These are the realities 
which carry great meaning for American foreign policy and the 
~~~ 
future course of the world. America should procee~ to normalize 
relations with the People's Republic of China, as 110 other 
nations have already done. 
What is past is prologue. To comprehend the state of U.S.-
China relations today requires an understanding of the past. 
American images of China have fluctuated and shifted over the 
years. Since the beginning of United States contact with China 
two centuries ago, Americans' feelings have been ambivalent. 
Generations of missionaries, traders, teachers, and travelers 
have created strong sentiments in America for China. On the 
one hand, these attachments provided a reservoir of goodwill 
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and respect. But, on the other, they created an attitude 
of superiority toward the Chinese. Paternalism has been the 
hallmark of American experience in China. Most Americans did 
not go to China to listen and learn but to preach, teach, and 
trade. They were the superiors, the Chinese the inferiors. 
Humanitarianism was mixed with a heavy blend of bigotry and 
greed. 
In the aftermath of World War II, affection turned to 
disappointment as the forces led by Chiang Kai-shek and Mao 
Tse-tung resumed the civil war. Disappointment became hostility 
when the U.S.-supported Kuomintang armies were forced to retreat 
to the island of Taiwan in 1949. One consequence of this defeat 
was the poisoning of the American political system . A bitter 
personal debate began over: "Who lost China?", as if China was 
ever ours to lose. From this there emerged a policy based on 
an official view of China as an aggressive, Soviet-directed giant, 
that posed a clear and present danger to its Asian neighbors. 
As late as 1960, in a television debate with John F. Kennedy, 
the then Vice President Nixon described the threat from China 
this way: 
"Now what do the Chinese Communists want? They 
don't want just Quemoy and Matsu. They don't want 
just Formosa. They want the world." 
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This distorted and mistaken view of China led directly 
to the McCarthy era which, a quarter of a century later, still 
afflicts American foreign policy. For too long, United States 
policy toward China was based on myths. Some of those myths 
were cleared away by President Nixon's 1972 journey to Peking. 
But United States relations with China today are on a plateau, 
reached more than three years ago with the opening of diplomatic 
liaison offices in Peking and Washington. There is only one 
obstacle to normalization, the Taiwan issue. 
"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat 
it," George Santayana wrote. That is especially pertinent to 
the position in which the United States finds itself concerning 
the normalization of relations with the People's Republic of 
China. An understanding of how United States policy came to 
be what it is today is essential to finding a solution to the 
current problem. The 1955 security treaty with the Republic of 
China is often cited as the impediment to normalizing U.S. 
relations with China. 
Senate approval of the security treaty with the losing 
side in China's civil war was based on the mistaken notion, 
stressed by the Eisenhower Administration, that Taiwan was 
vital to American security. Secretary Dulles, testifying for 
the treaty in executive session before the Foreign Relations 
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Committee painted a bleak picture of what would happen if the 
treaty were not approved . "If we," he said to the Committee, 
"allow that island chain to be broken through the Communists 
taking Formosa, in my opinion, the entire island chain will 
inevitably go. Japan will surely be lost, you will have a 
combination of power there of Russia, China and Japan, which 
will be more, a far more, serious threat than anything we have 
ever envisaged in that part of the world before, and our own 
defensive position will have to be pulled back very close to 
the Pacific mainland." 
The policy underlying the treaty saw the People's Republic 
as a reckless and powerful belligerent, maniuplated by the Soviet 
Union. But the new Chinese leadership saw itself as a struggling 
revolutionary government trying to build a new political and 
economic order out of the rubble of civil war. America's efforts 
to contain China were seen as an ex tension of the Western world's 
efforts in the past to dominate and exploit the country. 
The costs of this outdated policy, founded on a distortion 
of reality and deep internal political fears, are immeasurable. 
Its assumptions and miscalculations were a factor in bringing 
about the confrontation with China in Korea. And it was a key 
element in leading more than two and half million Americans into 
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the political quicksands of Southeast Asia. Thirty-three 
thousand Americans lost their lives in the hills and valleys 
of Korea, and 55,000 gave their lives in the paddies and jungles 
of Indochina. The dollar cost of the Vietnam war pales in 
comparison to the tragedy which that conflict inflicted on our 
national unity, faith in our political institutions, and our 
economic system. 
Time has proven that the justification presented to Congress 
for the Taiwan defense treaty was based on a distorted view, 
both of America's long-range interests in the Far East and of 
the nature of the People's Republic of China. America's security 
was never involved in the future of Taiwan. The specter of 
political consequences at home, not military defeat abroad, were 
the prime factors in shaping United States policy toward the 
Chinese civil war. The remnants of that era remain as a mill-
stone on American policy initiatives in the Far East. It is 
~~~ 
time to ,cu~ the Gordian knot. 
'' r , 1 
Concerning the Taiwan question, the Nixon-Chou En-lai 
Shanghai Communique stated the United States position, and I 
quote: 
"The U.S. side declared: The United States 
acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the 
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Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and 
that Taiwan is part of China. The United States 
Government does not challenge that position. It 
reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of 
the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With 
this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate 
objectives of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and 
"---
military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, 
it will progressively reduce its forces and military 
installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area 
diminishes." 
America's intervention in China's civil war persists today 
through continuing U.S. recognition of the Republic of China 
on Taiwan, through the furnishing of that government with 
military advice and arms, through the conduct of joint maneuvers 
with its armed forces, and through many ties between America 
and the Nationalist government which are designed to preserve 
Taiwan as an entity separate from the Chinese mainland. 
Although the number of U.S. military personnel has been 
reduced substantially since 1972, some 2,000 American service-
men are 
group. 
still stationed on 
Only ~year the 
Taiwan, including a military advisory 
remaining American military advisors 
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were withdrawn from Quemoy and Matsu, islands not covered 
by the security treaty. The Indochina war, the "tension in 
the area," to which the language in the Shanghai Communique 
referred, is long since over. The majority of the remaining 
American forces on Taiwan are engaged in activities which, if 
Americans put themselves in Chinese shoes, would be considered 
intolerable, since the activities are carried out on China's 
territory. United States military involvement with the 
Nationalist government through the supply of military equipment 
has accelerated since 1972, not lessened. 
China's position on Taiwan is the same as it has been since 
the signing of the Shanghai Communique. It expects the United 
~~) 
States1 to sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan, terminate the 
defense treaty, and withdraw all military forces from the island. 
This would be the application of the Japanese formula to the 
American situation. Since 1972, when it severed relations with 
Taiwan and established diplomatic relations with Peking, Japan's 
trade with, and investments in, Taiwan have continued at high 
levels. Japanese affairs relating to the island are looked after 
by a quasi-official office called the Japanese Interchange 
Association. Taiwan maintains a similar non-diplomatic office 
in Tokyo. Other countries having diplomatic relations with 
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China operate in Taiwan under similar arrangements. United 
States economic and cultural ties with Taiwan could continue 
in the same manner. However, there is no give by China on 
the principle they see involved: Taiwan is a part of China 
and when and how it will be absorbed into the life of the 
mainland is an internal affair. 
The answer to the Taiwan problem is not to be found in 
Peking but in Washington. It is a domestic problem for the 
United States. The fact that must be faced is that we cannot 
have it both ways. We cannot strengthen our ties with a claimant 
government of China on Taiwan and, at the same time, expect to 
advance a new relationship with the government of the People's 
Republic of China. The Shanghai Communique, in which both we 
and China agreed that normalization of relations was "in the 
interests of all countries," was designed as a transitional 
arrangement. It did not assume indefinite ambivalence in our 
policy. 
Much of the ambiguity concerning the Taiwan problem seems 
to stem from the hope that, with sufficient delay, the problem 
will go away. Some insist that, as a precondition to recognition, 
China renounce the use of force in regard to Taiwan. To 
appreciate what is involved here, one must look at this demand 
from the Chinese perspective. For China to renounce the use of 
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force against Taiwan would cast doubt on the validity of its 
claim to the island. As the Chinese see it, Taiwan is an 
integral part of China and, under the Shanghai Communique, 
the United States does not dispute this contention. It is 
unreasonable to expect a sovereign nation to renounce the 
right to use force to bring a rebellious province back into 
the fold. Can you imagine Abraham Lincoln renouncing the right 
to use force against the se essionist Southern states? ~~;. ~ 
d ~ ''B~a~s :.&.~l~w 11 tha a~y unpro~oked .mil~~ 
action against Taiwan would be a seriously unsettling event 
that would set off grave repercussions throughout Asia. Such 
an action would destroy American public support for a friendly 
relationship and thus undermine a basic element in China's policy 
to counter the Soviet threat. It would also create great un-
certainty in Japan, possibly leading to a revival of Japanese 
militarism and a closer relationship with the Soviet Union. A 
more practical obstacle is the fact that China does not -- and 
will not for the foreseeable future -- have the military capacity 
to invade and conquer Taiwan. The peaceful merging of Taiwan 
with the mainland must be an implicit element in working out ---diplomatic arrangements between the People's Republic and the 
United States. 
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Although it is unrealistic to expect that China will 
renounce the use of force to regain control of Taiwan, China 
is not likely to rush the process of absorbing Taiwan into 
the life of the mainland after the normalization of relations 
between China and the United States. To China, acceptance of 
the principle at stake and the incorporation of Taiwan into 
the nation are two different matters. The Chinese are im-
patient with regard to acceptance of the principle, the obstacle 
to complete normalization of relations. But, while the process 
of absorption is inevitable, it is likely to take many years. 
When full diplomatic relations are established with China, 
the treaty with the government on Taiwan will fall. There cannot 
be a defense treaty with the losing faction in a civil war while 
formal relations are maintained with the winning side. When 
Japan recognized the People's Republic of China in 1972, its 
treaty of friendship with Taiwan automatically lapsed. So will 
the U.S.-Taiwan security treaty when recognition comes. 
It has been urged that the treaty issue be handled by 
serving one-year notice of our intention to terminate the treaty, 
a right reserved to each country under Article X. This would 
only further confuse the principle at issue. If Taiwan is a 
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part of China, as all parties agree, serving a one-year notice 
to terminate the treaty means only additional delay in recon-
ciling our official diplomatic posture with national policy. 
It has also been argued that disengagement from the treaty 
commitment to the Republic of China will cause America's allies 
to question our resolve about other defense obligations. Every 
nation recognizes that the national interest must control foreign 
polky. If it were otherwise, a nation would be placed in a 
straight jacket with the ratification of every treaty. Treaties 
are not forever. They are national commitments which must be 
adjusted in the light of changing international realities and 
a clearer perception of the national interest. The Taiwan treaty 
was founded on what, at the time, were thought to be U.S. security 
needs against a Moscow-directed axis with Peking. That assump-
tion is now known to have been but a myth. 
Some say that Taiwan may either declare its independence 
or turn to the Soviet Union if the United States severs the 
treaty relationship. This ignores the fact that Taiwan's life-
blood, until it is absorbed into the economy of the mainland at 
some time in the distant future, is continued trade with the 
United States and Japan. Neither country could afford to do 
business with a break-away Taiwan or a Taiwan allied with 
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China's antagonist. These are not realistic alternatives 
for Taiwan. 
Formal diplomatic recognition of a nation does not mean 
approval of either its government or its political philosophy . 
The Cranston Resolution, adopted by the Senate seven years 
ago, stated: 'When the United States recognizes a foreign 
government and exchanges representatives with it, this does not 
of itself imply that the United States approves of the form, 
ideology or policy of that government." In other words, the 
Senate said that diplomatic recognition is but a recognition 
of reality. 
Bipartisanship has been the hallmark of our China policy 
since the opening began. Shortly before President Nixon's 
journey to Peking the Senate passed a resolution giving, and 
I quote: " .•. full support to the President in seeking the 
normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China." 
But Congress does not have a role in the recognition process. 
Although Congressional action may be necessary to arrange for 
continuation of trade and related ties to Taiwan to accord with 
a U.S. version of the Japanese formula, the recognition of 
foreign governments is the sole responsibility of the President. 
President Ford has stated on a number of occasions that 
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the United States is determined "to complete the normalization 
of relations with the People's Republic of China on the basis 
jq.~tw-~:-..~~~~ 
of the Shanghai Communique." AHowever, steps to do so have 
been taken with great reluctance . There has been a policy of 
avoidance. With the principal antagonists in the Chinese civil 
war now gone, it is time to wipe the slate clean. 
Taiwan is a point of utmost sensitivity in China's new 
national consciousness. It is a constant reminder of China's 
humiliation at the hands of outside powers. Equivocation over 
the Taiwan problem has continued far too long. Ambivalence has 
created a dangerous situation and further delay could bring 
about serious long-term consequences for American policy in the 
Pacific area. For more than six years we pursued a war in 
Indochina in the name of an illusive , undefined "peace with 
honor," a quest which resulted in trag ic losses of life and 
treasure. Now there are signs that the same chimera is creating 
a similar situation concerning the resolution of the Taiwan 
problem. 
Delay has created new pressures for retention of the status 
quo. Some imply that there is an easy way out, such as through 
a "two-Germany's" formula. Stagnation is the enemy of a sound, 
constructive foreign policy, and indecision in policy-making 
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about Taiwan is providing a political impetus for pushing 
citizens into choosing sides. There is a strong hint of a 
resurgence of the divisiveness of a quarter century ago that 
led to the current policy dilemma. Failure to face up to the 
Taiwan issue will only make the inevitable decision more 
difficult, controversial, and divisive. 
There are other dangers in delay. The internal problems 
of China in the wake of Mao's departure could create conditions 
in both countries where the mutual interests now sustaining the 
relationship will be weakened. Delay may well strengthen the 
hand of elements in the Chinese leadership who seek to ease 
tensions with their fellow Communists in the Soviet Union. The 
resumption of friendly relations with China stems in large part 
from the Sino-Soviet dispute. Absent a settlement of the Taiwan 
issue, this expediency sustains the U.S.-China relationship. 
Mao's legacy of ideological animosity to the Soviet Union, at 
least for the present, will be a restraining influence on 
Chinese accommodation with the Soviet Union. There are indica-
tions, however, that steps may be taken to settle the dispute 
and return Sino-Soviet relations to a more normal state of 
affairs. A thaw is possible and, when it comes, it is imperative 
that our relations with China be in good repair. 
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U.S. policies on the Taiwan issue are still saddled 
with anachronisms. We lag behind more than a hundred nations 
in dealing with a fundamental reality of the situation in Asia. 
We remain tied to a past which is fast receding into history 
and which has little relevance to the contemporary needs of 
the United States. 
To weigh the United States-China relationship in a 
reasonable context, Americans must look at common interests, 
not at our differences. That is what has brought the two 
countries together in the current unorthodox relationship. 
- We are both greatly concerned about the Soviet Union 
and its intentions. 
- We both have a need for better mutual understanding 
to avoid future miscalculations. 
- We have a common interest in the moderation of tensions 
in Asia and in seeing that the nations in the area remain 
free of domination by outside powers. 
- We both desire a viable Japan free of the danger of 
militarism. 
- We both seek a better world for the future generations 
in our respective countries. 
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For more than two decades the United States closed its 
official mind to China and the channels of effective communi-
cation between the two nations were blocked. The consequences 
of this period of know-nothingness still linger. Miscalculations 
about China may well have been the main factor in the involve-
ment of the United States in two major wars in Asia in a single 
generation. Pressures are at work which could cause another 
major miscalculation over Taiwan. 
The national interest is deeply involved in moving withou~ 
~rtber-daley to settle the Taiwan problem. Further delay could 
well prove to be another in the long series of disastrous mis-
calculations which have afflicted U.S. foreign policy in Asia 
since World War II . Solving this problem will put the United 
States in a unique position in the triangular relationship. If 
we act more wisely than in the past, we will act now, not on 
the basis of emotional catch-phrases, but on the basis of 
rational contemporary American interests in the Western Pacific. 
